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THE SENATE BLUE-SLIP PROCESS AS IT BEARS ON 
PROPOSALS TO SPLIT THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Wyatt Kozinski† 
 
The Ninth Circuit is by far the largest of the twelve regional circuits.1  This is 
true whether measured by the number of cases, the geographical reach, the size of the 
population, or the number of judges.2  On a number of occasions, going back to at 
least 1941,3 there have been calls to split the circuit—usually into two parts, but 
sometimes three.4  Serious split proposals invariably occur when Republicans are in 
control of at least one house of Congress and the White House is occupied by a 
Republican, and they subside when the White House and both houses of Congress 
are controlled by Democrats.5 
It is thus fair to conclude that proposals to split the Ninth Circuit are driven by 
politics rather than concerns about efficiency, collegiality, the limited en banc 
process, or other such “good government” factors that are trotted out as the ostensible 
reasons justifying the proposed split.6  With the recent capture of the White House 
 
 † J.D. candidate, University of Virginia Law School, 2018.  This essay benefited greatly from the advice 
of Professor Joshua Fischman of the University of Virginia Law School. 
 1  The regional circuits consist of the eleven numbered circuits plus the D.C. Circuit, and their jurisdiction 
is commensurate.  In 2016, the Ninth Circuit had 11,405 case filings, compared to 8,470 for the circuit with the 
next-highest filings (the Fifth).  The Ninth circuit thus handles about a fifth of the total caseload of the regional 
courts of appeals.  See Table N/A—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Court Management Statistics (December 
31, 2016), ADMIN OFF. U.S. CTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tab-
les/fcms_na_appcp1231.2016.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).  In terms of geography only the Federal Circuit is 
larger, as it has nationwide jurisdiction, but that circuit holds all of its hearings in Washington, so in terms of 
judicial travel time, the Ninth Circuit is by far the most challenging as it has regular places of sitting in San 
Francisco, Pasadena, Portland, Seattle, Anchorage, and Honolulu, while its judges live in far-flung locations 
such as Billings, Fairbanks, Pocatello, and Phoenix.  The Judges of this Court in Order of Seniority, U.S. CTS 
FOR THE 9TH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_seniority_list.php?pk_id=0000000035 (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 2  See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders, Bill to Remove Nevada, 5 Other States from ‘Nutty 9th’ Circuit Court May 
Be Gaining Favor, L.V. REV. J. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-
government/nevada/bill-to-remove-nevada-5-other-states-from-nutty-9th-circuit-court-may-be-gaining-favor/. 
 3  Id. 
 4  See Alex Kozinski & Sidney Thomas, Don’t Split the Ninth Circuit, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2001), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110005241073369758 (discussing a bill passed in the House of 
Representatives at the behest of Rep. Mike Simpson of Idaho that would have split the circuit into three parts). 
 5  By way of example, there were very serious split proposals during the time of the H.W. Bush 
Administration in the early 2000s but no split activity during the 8 years of the Obama Administration. 
 6  Senators John McCain and Jeff Flake of Arizona refer to the “oversized and overworked” Ninth circuit, 
as well as its slowness in deciding cases.  See, e.g., Suevon Lee, Sens. McCain, Flake Introduce Bill to Split 9th 
Circ., LAW 360 (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/888068; Diarmuid O’Scannlain, A 
Ninth Circuit Split is Inevitable but Not Imminent, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 947 (1995). 
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and both houses of Congress by Republicans, proposals to split the circuit have, 
inevitably, sprung up like mushrooms after a rainfall. 
Although, on the surface, the split debate centers on efficiency, timeliness, 
reversal rates, and other such objective considerations,7 these arguments are largely 
window dressing for what is really going on, which is a battle of ideologies.  
Republicans believe that the Ninth Circuit is too liberal and, as such, out of alignment 
with the Supreme Court, which has to step in and correct the “Nutty Ninth.”8  The 
split effort seems to be driven by the desire to stop the Ninth Circuit and its huge 
caseload from serving as a generator of liberal, Supreme Court-defying law.  Other 
Republicans, on the Hill as well as in the Executive Branch, may simply see splitting 
the circuit as a spanking—a way to retaliate against those liberal judges who create 
troublesome law.9  The judges of the circuit do nothing to defuse the claim that it is 
a liberal outpost, issuing controversial rulings over the years, including holding that 
the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional,10 that there is a constitutional right to 
assisted suicide11 and, most recently, upholding the injunction against President 
Trump’s travel ban.12  Even rulings by district judges within the Ninth Circuit 
precipitate calls for breaking up the circuit.  Just earlier this year, President Trump 
reacted to an injunction entered by a judge in the Northern District of California 
enjoining the Executive Order cutting off funding for so-called “sanctuary cities,”13 
by threatening to break up the circuit: 
President Trump said Wednesday that he has ‘absolutely’ considered 
proposals that would split up the [Ninth] Circuit Court of Appeals, where 
judges have blocked two of his executive actions. 
. . . .  
‘Everybody immediately runs to the 9th Circuit. And we have a big 
country.  We have lots of other locations.  But they immediately run to the 
9th Circuit.  Because they know that’s like, semi-automatic,’ Trump said.14 
 
 7  Kevin Daley, SPLIT IT: Congress Considers Splitting the 9th Circuit, THE DAILY CALLER (Mar. 16, 
2017), http://dailycaller.com/2017/03/16/split-it-congress-considers-splitting-the-9th-circuit/#ixzz4cYTouj1D. 
 8  See, e.g. Barnini Chakraborty, Republicans Push Bill to Split up ‘Nutty 9th Circuit,’ FOX NEWS (Feb. 
9. 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/09/bill-to-split-nutty-9th-circuit-gains-momentum.html. 
 9  Daley, supra note 7 (“Like clockwork we see proposals to split the 9th Circuit whenever it hands down 
decisions with which conservatives disagree.”) (quoting House Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Rep. 
Jerry Nadler). 
10  Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002). 
11  Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 122 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 1997). 
12  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
13  Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d (N.D. Cal. 2017).  See also Sadie Gurman & Julie 
Bykowicz, Judge Cites Trump’s Comment in ‘Sanctuary City’ Ruling, FOX NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/04/26/judge-cites-trump-comment-in-sanctuary-city-ruling.html (“White 
House chief of staff Reince Priebus described the ruling as another example of the ‘9th Circuit going 
bananas.’”). 
14  Sarah Westwood, Exclusive Interview: Trump ‘Absolutely’ Looking at Breaking up 9th Circuit, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Apr 26, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/exclusive-interview-trump-absolutely-
looking-at-breaking-up-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals/article/2621379. 
  
70 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 44:1] 
While efforts to split the circuit have failed so far, it is possible that they will 
eventually succeed.  Certainly, those who are pursuing split legislation are taking the 
matter very seriously.  For example, Chairman Goodlatte of the House Judiciary 
Committee has indicated that litigation reform, which includes splitting the circuit, is 
“a priority.”15  And the Senators from Arizona, both Republicans, seem poised to 
pursue a split effort vigorously.16  There are, I believe, many sound arguments against 
splitting the Ninth Circuit, ably advanced by the three judges who testified at the 
recent hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Internet of the House Judiciary Committee.17  But, as previously mentioned, the battle 
is not likely to be won or lost on the merits of the proposal; if members of Congress 
were truly interested in speeding up how quickly cases are decided and other defects 
they see in the way the Ninth Circuit operates, they could simply vote for the 
additional five judgeships that the Judicial Conference of the United States has 
requested for decades.18  And if Republicans want a more conservative Ninth Circuit, 
President Trump could start by filling the four existing vacancies—for three of which 
there are no nominees pending.19  
The real question is whether the political gains the Republicans are likely to 
derive from a split are going to be worth the inevitable fight it will generate so that 
 
15  Lydia Wheeler, GOP Eyes New Push to Break up California Court, THE HILL (Jan. 22, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/315354-gop-eyes-new-push-to-break-up-california-court; see also 
Press Release, House Judiciary Comm., Statement of House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte at 
Hearing on Restructuring the Ninth Circuit, (March 16, 2017), https://judiciary.house.gov/press-
release/statement-house-judiciary-committee-chairman-bob-goodlatte-hearing-restructuring-ninth-circuit/.  
See, also infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
16  Associated Press, Arizona Lawmakers Again Push for Split of 9th Circuit Court, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 
3, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/arizona-lawmakers-again-push-for-split-of-9th-circuit-
court/.  The junior senator from Arizona seems so vested in the effort that he reacted angrily to a comment 
suggesting that the circuit judges strongly oppose the split.  Ronald J. Hansen, Sen. Jeff Flake Hits 9th Circuit 
for Opposing Court Split, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 9, 2017) 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/azdc/2017/02/10/jeff-flake-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals-
split/97720952/. 
17  Bringing Justice Closer to the People: Examining Ideas for Restructuring the 9th Circuit: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
(2017), available at https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/bringing-justice-closer-people-examining-ideas-
restructuring-9th-circuit/ [hereinafter Bringing Justice Closer Hearings].  What one finds most persuasive is 
that the overwhelming number of Ninth Circuit judges—Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and 
liberals, men and women—oppose the split after thoughtful consideration of the issue.  See, e.g., Hon. Mary M. 
Schroeder et al., A Court United: A Statement of a Number of Ninth Circuit Judges, 6 ENGAGE 1 (2006) (co-
authored by 33 Ninth Circuit Judges). 
18  Judicial Conference Asks Congress to Create New Judgeships, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/03/14/judicial-conference-asks-congress-create-new-judgeships (“If an 
omnibus judgeship bill is enacted into law, it would be first new comprehensive judgeship legislation to take 
effect in more than 26 years.”). 
19  Ross Todd, As Trump Rails at Ninth Circuit, White House Eyes Vacancies, THE RECORDER (April 27, 
2016), http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202784772859/As-Trump-Rails-at-Ninth-Circuit-White-House-
Eyes-Vacancies?mcode=1202617583589&curindex=1&slreturn=20170911234753.  President Trump has 
nominated Ryan Wesley Bounds to fill one vacancy.  See Karoun Demirjian, Grassley Schedules Contentious 
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the benefits outweigh the opportunity and other costs.20  If it does, then perhaps the 
battle is worth waging, whether or not splitting is a good idea in some sort of abstract 
“good government” sense.  But if the political gains are not as great as anticipated, 
or are in fact negative, then Republicans might be wiser to spend their limited time 
and energy pursuing other political goals.  Politics is, after all, not only the art of the 
possible, but also the art of the feasible.  If a successful effort is likely to result in 
marginal or negative gains, then perhaps the fight should be averted. 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the political implications of a split and 
try to gauge whether it’s likely to result in substantial benefits from a Republican or 
conservative point of view.  This note will consider only the Republican point of view 
because they are the ones who are in control of both houses of Congress and the 
White House, and thus are in a position to set the agenda.  And they are the ones 
pushing for change.  
Before turning to this task, I offer two observations or caveats.  First, I see 
nothing incongruous about applying political criteria to evaluating legislation 
involving courts.  While the process of judging is—or is supposed to be—non-
political, the process of passing laws, determining jurisdiction of courts, creating 
judicial positions, and appointing judges to fill them are all political acts that 
inherently call for political judgments.  Such political judgments sometimes take into 
account questions of efficiency, equity, and similar objective factors, but even such 
factors usually resolve themselves into political questions.21  Ultimately, therefore, 
the decision will be made based on political considerations, so any argument that is 
likely to persuade any of the key players must be couched in political terms. 
Second, any attempt to split the Ninth Circuit faces some formidable 
demographic obstacles that did not exist when Congress split the Fifth Circuit some 
thirty-five years ago.22  These demographic factors will not only make it more 
difficult to come up with a satisfactory split, but bear directly on the political 
considerations that drive the split effort.  The subject is sufficiently significant that it 
deserves a brief detour away from politics. 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM 
When Congress went about splitting the old Fifth Circuit in the late 1970s, it had 
no difficulty in figuring out how to do it.  The circuit consisted of two mega-states—
Texas and Florida—that were fortuitously located at opposite ends of the circuit.  
More or less in-between were four smaller states: Georgia and Alabama closest to 
 
20  There is no doubt that there will be substantial costs, given the strong opposition of the Democrats in 
Congress, as expressed at the recent hearings on the subject, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, and the 
fact that the split will inevitably reduce the influence of California, which is very likely to attract the determined 
opposition of Senator Feinstein who has already shown herself to be a fierce opponent of splitting the Ninth 
Circuit.  See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Sen. Diane Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Fights Back Effort to Split 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, (April 19, 2007), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=0BA37422-F9AF-C888-C132-66DB0833DD80/. 
21  This is exemplified by reference to the adage: “Justice delayed is justice denied,” which is true if you’re 
a plaintiff in a civil case.  Defense lawyers turn the adage on its head: “Justice denied is justice.” 
22  Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) 
(codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41 (2012)). 
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Florida, and Louisiana and Mississippi closest to Texas.  This permitted an elegant 
split which maintained what was thought to be the minimum number of states in a 
circuit, namely three, and divided the caseload more or less evenly.  This followed 
the recommendation of the so-called Hruska Commission,23 which had been tasked 
by Congress in 1973 to study what were then the two largest circuits, the Fifth and 
the Ninth, and make recommendations for their re-structuring. 
As the Hruska Commission soon found out, however, the Ninth Circuit was a 
much tougher nut to crack, and the principal problem could be summarized in a single 
word: California.  California generated then, as it does now, more than half of the 
circuit’s caseload;24 it has more than half the circuit’s population;25 and, because it 
has the circuit’s two largest commercial centers, Los Angeles and San Francisco, it 
gets a disproportionate number of important cases.  The bottom line is that there is 
no elegant way to split the Ninth Circuit while keeping California intact.  Moreover, 
some of the other problems that a split was supposed to solve simply could not be 
solved: for example, any circuit that has Alaska and/or Hawaii in it is going to require 
judges to travel vast distances. 
The innovative solution adopted by the Hruska Commission was to split 
California into two parts, north and south, and leave Northern California in the Ninth 
Circuit (along with Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Alaska and Hawaii); 
Southern California, along with Arizona and Nevada, would become the Twelfth 














23  See COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 
OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1973), reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 
(1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA REPORT]; see also Featured Series: Redistrict the U.S. Court of Appeals (Hruska), 
CONST. PARTY OF IDAHO (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.cpidaho.org/archives/featured-series-redistrict-the-u-s-
court-of-appeals-hruska/ [hereinafter Featured Series]. 
24  In 2016, California’s four districts had a total of 7,321 case filings out of a total of 11,305 for the 
circuit, or sixty-five percent.  Ninth Circuit FY 2016 Filings, U.S. CTS. FOR THE 9TH CIR., 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/04/19/FY16%20filings%20by%20State.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2017). 
25  There are 65 million people in the Ninth Circuit, 39 million (or fifty-seven percent) of which are in 
California.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED 
STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2016 (2016). 
26  HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 23, at 28. 
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The idea of dividing a state into two federal circuits “proved to be the [Hruska 
Commission’s] redistricting effort’s undoing.  After all, legitimate concerns existed 
regarding a state’s uniform legal code under interpretation by two different federal 
circuit courts.”27  Although commentators occasionally continue to propose splitting 
California into two circuits as the only viable solution for dividing the Ninth 
Circuit,28 the idea has largely been discredited and abandoned as creating too many 
insuperable problems. 
None of the current split proposals pending in the House or the Senate call for 
dividing California among two circuits.  Which, of course, leaves the problem of 
California, a state that generates 65 percent of the Ninth Circuit’s caseload; a state 
which, if it were a circuit by itself, would be the third largest.  California already 
dominates the huge circuit it’s in, with more of everything—cases, judges oral 
arguments— than the rest of the states in the circuit combined.  But the presence of 
eight other states at least provides a reasonable balance.29  Removing six or seven of 
the states will leave California so dominant that practically every three-judge panel 
will be controlled by California Judges.  Thus, if the proposals advanced by Senator 
Daines30 or Congressman Simpson31 were adopted, the new Ninth Circuit would 
consist only of California and Hawaii, which would mean there would be sixteen 
California judges and just one non-California judge from Hawaii.32  Even as a 
theoretical matter, it would be impossible to get a three-judge panel controlled by 
non-California circuit judges. If, on the other hand, Senator Flake’s proposal were 
adopted,33 the new Ninth Circuit would consist of California, Hawaii, and Oregon.34  
 
27  Featured Series, supra note 23. 
28  See, e.g., Eric J. Gribbin, Note, California Split: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47 DUKE L.J. 351 
(1997).  However, this view was recently reiterated by Prof. Fitzpatrick, testifying before the House Judiciary 
committee.  Bringing Justice Closer Hearings, supra note 17, at 14 (Statement of Prof. Brian T. Fitzpatrick). 
29  For example, there are sixteen judicial positions located in California, which leaves thirteen positions 
(of the circuit’s 29 authorized positions) spread out over the remaining eight states.  Moving judicial positions 
from one state to another is virtually impossible, as was demonstrated when Idaho tried to lay claim to the seat 
vacated by the retirement of Judge Steven Trott in 2004.  Trott was originally from California but set up 
chambers in Idaho shortly after his appointment in 1988.  When he took senior status sixteen years later, Idaho 
claimed the seat as its own but Senator Feinstein opposed any and all candidates not from California.  See 
Pamela MacLean, Sole Remaining Circuit Vacancy Open Eight Years, TRIAL INSIDER (Jun. 13, 2012), 
http://www.trialinsider.com/?p=1804.  The seat remained vacant for ten years, until the Idaho senators backed 
down and President Obama appointed John Owens of California. See Maura Dolan, Two Lawyers from the 
Same California Firm Nominated for Ninth Circuit, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/01/local/la-me-ln-9th-circuit-appointees-20130801. 
30  Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act, S. 295, 115th Congress (2017). 
31  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2017, H.R. 196, 115th Congress 
(2017). 
32  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2016), each state in the circuit is entitled to at least one resident active 
circuit judge. 
33  Judicial Administration and Improvement Act of 2017, S. 276, 115th Congress (2017), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/276?r=13. 
34  There are two other proposals in the legislative hopper, but I will not discuss them because they are 
considered outliers and far less likely to pass than the proposals discussed in text.  One is the Ninth Circuit 
Court Modernization and Twelfth Circuit Court Creation Act of 2017, H.R. 1598, 115th Cong. (20172018), 
introduced Mar.17, 2017, by Rep. Gohmert.  This bill would leave California in a circuit by itself.  The other 
one is the Judicial Administration and Improvement Act of 2016, H.R. 250, 115th Cong. (2017), introduced 
Jan. 4, 2017, by Rep. Biggs.  This bill would leave Washington in the Ninth Circuit, in addition to California, 
Hawaii, and Oregon.  In any event, these proposals would not change the analysis significantly because both 
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There are two active judicial positions in Oregon, one filled by a Democratic 
appointee and the other one vacant, which means that, once the vacancy is filled, only 
five percent of all panels will be controlled by non-Californians.35  It’s thus fair to 
say that any split of the Ninth Circuit will result in what will still be a very large 
circuit, one that is overwhelmingly dominated by judges from California, almost all 
of them living in one of the large urban centers—San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
San Diego.36 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL AND PANEL EFFECTS 
Much of the available literature on attitudinal decision-making concerns matters 
which comport with common sense and about which, I believe, there can be no 
reasonable dispute.  By saying this I don’t mean to criticize authors for undertaking 
studies and reporting their findings.  As Einstein proved, common sense is not 
infallible,37 and it is often useful to test empirically what we believe we know 
intuitively.  Nevertheless, it is not surprising to learn that judges do, indeed, have 
policy preferences; that they like results in cases when they are consistent with their 
policy preferences; that they will craft their opinions so as to protect, as best as 
possible, the result they reach; and that they will be more likely to write broadly when 
they believe there is a relatively low probability of being reversed by forces internal 
or external to their court.38  Nor should it be surprising—or even troubling—that the 
 
Washington Senators are Democrats.  I have also omitted discussion of the fact that some of the bills, such as 
that proposed by Sen. Daines, would add five new positions to the Ninth Circuit.  If this were to happen, it 
would only exacerbate the effects discussed later in the paper because all of the new seats would have to be 
allocated to the circuit containing California, but it is considered unlikely that Congress would add positions to 
the Ninth Circuit and not to any of the other circuits.  Any bill purporting to add positions to the Ninth Circuit 
would face objections from legislators elsewhere that their local circuits also deserve additional judgeships.  
That alone would make these proposals legislative non-starters. 
35  Assuming nineteen active judges, randomly assigned in panels of three, there would be 969 possible 
panels, using the formula n!/(r!(n−r)!).  Then, according to a permutation/combination calculator, there would 
be forty-nine panels where the non-California judges occupy either two or three positions.  49/969 = 
5.056759545%.  MATH IS FUN, https://www.mathsisfun.com/combinatorics/combinations-permutations-
calculator.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).  In real life, the odds may be even slimmer because of the existence 
of senior circuit judges, who will overwhelmingly be from California and thus likely to skew the numbers even 
farther in favor of California-controlled panels.  And there is also the incidence of visiting judges who will 
consist in part of district judges from inside the circuit (again, skewed heavily in favor of California) and senior 
circuit and district judges from outside the circuit, who would provide a non-California counterbalance.  I have 
left senior and visiting judges out of the calculus because their number varies significantly over time and is very 
difficult to predict. 
36  The lone exception is Judge Callahan who has her office in Sacramento but lives in Stockton.  See Jeff 
Chorney, Judicial Profile: Consuelo Callahan, THE RECORDER (Jan. 18, 2005), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/900005421841/. 
37  Einstein is credited with saying that “common sense is nothing more than a deposit of prejudices laid 
down in the mind before age eighteen,” but he may not have actually said it.  QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/04/29/common-sense/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).  Nevertheless, his theories 
of Special and General Relativity prove the adage. 
38  See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2002); Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733 (2003); 
Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941, 35 AM. POL. 
SCI, REV. 890 (1941)  (all discussing the attitudinal theory of judicial decision making); see also CASS SUNSTEIN 
ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Frank Cross & 
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policy preference of judges will generally reflect their political views which, in turn, 
will reflect the political views of the President who appoints them and, to a lesser 
degree, the Senate that confirms them.  Judging, after all, is not an entirely objective 
enterprise like the strike zone in baseball.  Rather, it involves the exercise of judgment 
and the weighing of policy considerations.  In close cases not controlled by precedent, 
judges must rely on their own values in making decisions, and those values, not 
surprisingly, often mirror the values of the President who appoints them. 
Nor should we be surprised that judges’ votes in cases are affected by the 
colleagues with whom they share the bench.  Appellate decisions are by their design 
collegial, and it would be astonishing and disappointing if we were to learn that 
appellate judges made decisions wholly independent of each other.  Indeed, if the 
studies are to be faulted, it is for treating the judges as insular decision-makers rather 
than as an integral part of a decision-making group.  As Judge Edwards explains, 
judges on appellate panels read the same cases, briefs and record materials, and they 
deliberate as a group rather than making independent decisions and then casting votes 
without knowing the views of the other members of the panel.39  Appellate decisions 
thus are less an arithmetic addition of three independent views and more of a 
confluence of rationales that seek, whenever possible, to reach agreement. 
There are thus many reasons judges would be prone to moderate their policy 
views when faced with two colleagues both of whose views are different from their 
own, than when all three judges are in agreement: (1) that two colleagues disagree 
may cause the third judge to doubt his views and change his mind; (2) the third judge 
may not be entirely persuaded by the majority but feel that certainty in the law is an 
independent value which would be undermined by a dissent; (3) the third judge may 
not feel very strongly about the issue and decide not to risk an unpleasant 
confrontation with colleagues over what the judge may consider a trivial difference 
of opinion; (4) the judge may be overburdened with work and feel it isn’t worth 
increasing his own workload and that of his colleagues by engaging in what may be 
a protracted back-and-forth that a dissent may call for; and (5) the third judge may 
feel that writing a dissent may actually make the situation worse because it would 
underscore that the majority considered and rejected the arguments raised by the 
dissent, whereas some points may otherwise remain vague and be subject to 
“reinterpretation” by a later panel.  Finally, (6) when a judge sits on a panel with two 
other judges whose policy views are simpatico, they may encourage each other to 
give vent to their policy views and be less careful about dotting the I’s and crossing 
the T’s in terms of legal doctrine.  And, of course, these reasons are not mutually 
exclusive; one or more may apply to any one case but not to another.  Taken together, 
they add up to what Professor Fischman calls “a strong norm of consensus” in the 
federal courts of appeals.40  Moreover, as Fischman and others have shown, this 
 
Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998).  
39  Harry Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1360–61 
(1998). 
40  Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework, 31 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 808, 808 (2013). 
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tendency towards conformity is not limited to ideology.  Rather, “judges’ votes are 
similarly affected by their colleagues’ race, gender, or prior work experience.”41 
What common sense tells us, then, and scholarship seems to prove, is the 
unremarkable proposition that when it comes to close cases, there is usually no 
objectively right answer, and judges’ votes are informed by their personal 
characteristics (which include ideology, sex, race, life experience, etc.) and the votes 
cast by the other judges on the panel.  What this suggests is that a court consisting of 
a diverse body of judges is likely to be more moderate in its views than a court that 
is homogenous.  This is because judges who are alike in various characteristics are 
likely to reinforce each other in their views, whereas judges who are diverse are likely 
to moderate each other’s views, in accordance with the aforesaid “strong norm of 
consensus.”  This has important implications for the likely behavior of the judges of 
any post-split Ninth Circuit, a subject that will be taken up in the next section. 
MODERN CONFIRMATION POLITICS AND THE POST-SPLIT NINTH CIRCUIT 
Because any post-split Ninth Circuit will have California in it, it will have at least 
sixty-five percent of the caseload of the current Ninth Circuit.42  Adding Hawaii 
would raise the percentage to sixty-six, adding Oregon brings it to seventy-one 
percent.  Thus, one way or the other, the bulk of the old Ninth Circuit’s cases would 
be transferred to the new Ninth Circuit, but the demographics of the court of appeals 
judges would be significantly different: the overwhelming number of judges of the 
new circuit would come from the two mega-metropolitan areas of Los Angeles and 
San Francisco.  Gone would be judges from small towns or rural areas like Boise, 
Anchorage, Pocatello, Reno, Fairbanks, and Billings.  The effect their small-town 
outlook has on their participation on panels would be lost.  The new Ninth Circuit 
would thus become a court not only dominated by California judges, but also by 
judges with a big-city perspective.  This could make a difference in many cases 
ranging from the environment to immigration where the outlook of big-city dwellers 
may be quite different from that of judges living in less densely populated areas.  It 
would also mean that, as a practical matter, cases would almost always be decided 
by a panel controlled by judges from California.43 
But the demographic effects of any split would be dwarfed when compared to 
the political effects.  In short, any of the proposed splits of the Ninth Circuit would 
result in a circuit that still had a substantial majority of the old Ninth Circuit’s cases 
but would be considerably more liberal than the current Ninth Circuit, thus defeating 
the principal objectives of those Republican legislators who support the split.44  One 
 
41  Id. at 809. 
42  In 2016, the last year for which whole-year statistics are available, 11,305 cases were filed that were 
reviewable by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; 7,321 of those were out of California; 174 out of Hawaii; 
500 out of Oregon.  See Ninth Circuit FY 2016 Filings , supra note 24. 
43  See 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2012). 
44  See, e.g., Bringing Justice Closer Hearings, supra note 17, at 26 (Statement of Rep. Chaffet) (“And 
I’ve got to tell you, there is a great deal of frustration with the Ninth Circuit.  There are people that are absolutely 
fed up with some of these things.  As a Member of Congress, I’ve got to tell you, the rulings that we’ve had 
coming out against President Trump to protect our borders and secure this nation . . . is infuriating to us, to look 
to the Ninth Circuit, to see people say: well there’s, you know, 70 people here that we’ve got to protect and 80 
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might think that splitting the circuit would have no effect on the political outlook of 
the judges because the judges will reflect the political outlook of the President who 
appoints them.  This, indeed, has been the working assumption of various studies of 
panel effects such as Revesz, Cross and, Sunstein.  And this may have been a valid 
assumption until the last quarter of the Twentieth Century when Presidents largely 
had a free hand in selecting judges for the inferior federal courts, virtually without 
interference from the Senate.45 
The situation today is quite different.  Starting in the 1980s, senators began to 
use the confirmation process to deny Presidents a free hand in the appointment of 
judges to the circuit and district courts.  In 1984, thirty-nine senators voted against 
the confirmation of J. Harvie Wilkinson to the Fourth Circuit46 and in 1985, forty-
three Senators voted against the confirmation of my father, Alex Kozinski, to the 
Ninth Circuit.47  And in 1986, Daniel Manion, whom President Reagan nominated to 
the Seventh Circuit, squeaked by on a vote of 5049.48  
The story of how the confirmation fire dance has evolved over the last three 
decades is far beyond the scope of this paper.  Suffice to say that numerous qualified 
 
people here. What about protecting the United States of America?  And it’s the Ninth Circuit that is causing 
these problems and taking away the duties that the Judiciary Committee, the Congress has given to the President 
of the United States to protect our borders.  There are people that are outraged about this  . . . . but I’ve got to 
tell you, according to some others that I hear on this panel say, where is the outrage? There are a lot of us that 
are outraged.”); see also id. at 30 (Statement of Rep. Desantis) (“[H]ere’s why I think I’m concerned, because 
I think that some of the courts in your circuit are playing a dangerous game here.  I mean, when you talked 
about analyzing an executive action that’s taken directly pursuant to a very broad congressional statute and you 
basically say: If the President was somebody else it would be lawful, but because this President campaigned 
and said things that we disagree with, oh no, call it off it’s illegal . . . .  But my concern is, is that when that’s 
being done and you’re invoking these campaign statements, I don’t see a principled way where that’s going to 
wind up making sense through the long term.  And I understand there is antipathy in our country that is reflected 
in some of your courts for the current President, but that is not enough of a reason to wade into some of these 
sensitive matters involving national security. And so I think the courts, you know, while they think they’re 
saving the day from some people’s perspectives, I think they maybe—end up in the long run undermining their 
proper role.”). 
45  The confirmation hearings of Judge Harry Pregerson to the Ninth Circuit in 1979, exemplify the 
situation, when questioned by Senator Alan Simpson: 
Simpson: If a decision in a particular case was required by case law or statute, as interpreted 
according to the intent that you would perceive as legislative intent, and yet that offended your own 
conscience, what might you do in that situation? 
Pregerson: . . . I have to be honest with you.  If I was faced with a situation like that and it ran 
against my conscience, I would follow my conscience. 
Simpson: I didn’t hear, sir. 
Pregerson: I said, if I were faced with a situation like that, that ran against my conscience, disturbed 
my conscience, I would try and find a way to follow my conscience and do what I perceived to be 
right and just. 
Hugh Hewitt, The Law’s Conscience, THE WKLY. STANDARD (Sept. 8, 2003 11:00 PM), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-laws-conscience/article/4372 (quoting Hearings Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979)) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted).  Today, of course, a nominee who 
expressed such views would be swiftly withdrawn by the White House and ridden out of town on a rail. 
46  PAUL KENGOR AND PETER SCHWEIZER, THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: ASSESSING THE MAN AND HIS 
LEGACY 104 (2005). 
47  Id. 
48  Philip Shenon, Senate, Ending Judicial Fight, Gives Manion Final Approval, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
1986, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/24/us/senate-ending-judicial-fight-gives-manion-
final-approval.html. 
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nominees were denied confirmation, often without the benefit of an up-or-down vote 
on the Senate floor or even in committee,49 while other qualified candidates were 
never nominated because of anticipated objections from the Senate.50 
Senators have numerous procedural devices they can deploy to block or seriously 
slow down the confirmation of a judicial candidate they consider unacceptable, 
principal among them the filibuster,51 the hold,52 and the blue slip.53  And, if the 
Senate is controlled by a different party than the White House, the Senate can simply 
refuse to schedule a hearing on a pending judicial nomination, thereby denying the 
President his appointment without even a vote.  While this happened famously with 
the nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, it happens with surprising 
frequency in the inferior federal courts.54  Most recently, the two Republican Senators 
from Texas appear to have leveraged their control over the confirmation process to 
effectively co-opt the President’s authority to select judicial nominees,55 and 
maintain three Fifth Circuit vacancies for President Trump to fill, one of them dating 
back to 2012.56  Just recently, Senator Feinstein appears to have followed this model 
 
49  Included in this group are Miguel Estrada and Peter Keisler, nominated to the D.C. Circuit.  See  Dana 
Bush, Estrada Withdraws as Judicial Nominee, CNN (Sept. 5, 2003), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/04/estrada.withdraws/; Peter Keisler, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/keisler.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2017); Carolyn Kuhl to the Ninth, see  Judicial Nominee Battles Intensify, CQ ALMANAC 2003, 59TH ED., 13–
19. (2004); and James Lyons and Christine Arguello to the Tenth Circuit, see Maria Echaveste, Brown to Black: 
The Politics of Judicial Appointments for Latinos, 13 LA RAZA L. J. 39, 39 (2015). 
50  There are numerous examples in this category, many of them not publicly documented because such 
consultations between the White House and the Senate are often conducted prior to any public announcement.  
But one well-documented example is Peter Edelman, never nominated to the D.C. Circuit in response to 
objections from Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch.  Neil Lewis, Clinton, Fearing Fight, Shuns 
Bid to Name Friend as Judge, N.Y. TIMES , Sep. 1, 1995, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/01/us/clinton-fearing-fight-shuns-bid-to-name-friend-as-judge.html.  See 
also infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
51  Filibuster, JUD. NOMINATIONS, http://judicialnominations.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Filibus-
ter.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
52  “Holds”, JUD. NOMINATIONS, http://judicialnominations.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Holds.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
53  Blue Slips, JUD. NOMINATIONS, http://judicialnominations.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Blue-
Slips.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
54  In 1991, Carlos T. Bea was nominated by President George H.W. Bush for a seat on the Northern 
District of California, but he never received a vote and his nomination expired at the end of the Term in 1992.  
He was eventually nominated and confirmed to the Ninth Circuit in 2003. San Francisco Superior Court Judge 
Carlos Bea Nominated to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (April 16, 
2003), http://www.metnews.com/articles/beax041603.htm. The Ninth Circuit seat eventually filled by Bea in 
2003 had been vacant since 1996 and President Clinton had thrice nominated attorney (now state judge) Barry 
Goode to that position, but the Republican-controlled Senate refused to schedule a hearing.  Matthew Hirsch, 
Barry Goode, THE RECORDER (Mar. 24, 2008), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/900005504830/; Bush 
Dumps Clinton Nominees, CBS NEWS (March 20, 2001, 10:27 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-
dumps-clinton-nominees/.  There are dozens such examples over the last three decades. 
55  Maria Recio, Cruz, Cornyn Slow-Play Texas Judicial Vacancies after Trump Election, MY STATESMAN 
(Feb. 17, 2017, 12:43 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/cruz-cornyn-
slow-play-texas-judicial-vacancies-after-trump-election/ETwhHdMR4BzypVRHtvRmjJ/. 
56  Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-va-
cancies/current-judicial-vacancies (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
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by inviting applicants for judicial and other positions that require Senate 
confirmation, apparently without any involvement from the White House.57   
I believe therefore that it is a mistake to presume that judicial nominees will 
reflect the political views of the President who appoints them; a more nuanced 
approach is appropriate, where both the political orientation and the intensity of the 
nominee’s political leanings is taken into account.  And this will turn on two factors: 
(1) whether the President and the majority of the Senate are from the same party; and 
(2) whether the President and both senators from the nominee’s state are of the same 
party.  It can be presumed nowadays that Presidents will seek to appoint judicial 
candidates that most closely mirror the President’s views.  The President is most 
likely to achieve this where both of these conditions are satisfied, for obvious reasons: 
where the President and the Senate are of the same party, it is very likely that the 
Senate will seek to accommodate the President by scheduling hearings and a floor 
vote promptly; there will be no reason for delay, and certainly not on grounds of 
ideology.  The invocation of the “nuclear option” by Senate Majority Leader Reid in 
2013, which removes the filibuster for lower-court judicial nominees,58 will only 
make it easier for a President and Senate to override objections by the opposite-party 
minority. 
But a President will not have a truly free hand in selecting his court of appeals 
nominees59 unless the second condition above is satisfied: both senators from the 
nominee’s home district must be of the same party as the President.  This is because, 
under the Senate’s Blue Slip rule, the Senate Judiciary Committee will not normally 
take a vote on a judicial nominee who does not obtain the approval (“Blue Slip”) of 
his home-state senators.  While the Blue Slip rule is not iron-clad, it has proven 
effective on numerous occasions to block qualified nominees to the federal bench.60 
Thus, the President will have a free hand in appointing judges only where he has 
the same party affiliation as the Senate majority and both senators from the state 
where the judgeship is located.  In that situation he can appoint judges as 
ideologically aligned with him as he wishes without the fear of serious pushback from 
 
57  Judiciary Applications, OFF. OF SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/publ-
ic/index.cfm/applications-jud (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
58  Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-
party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-
fd2ca728e67c_story.html?utm_term=.5b8f7a50beed. 
59  Because of Senatorial Courtesy and the Blue Slip rule, a president never has a totally free hand in 
selecting nominees to the district courts these days.  Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy is said to have 
described the process as follows: “Basically, it’s senatorial appointment with the advice and consent of the 
president.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 40 (8th ed. 
2008). 
60  For example, in 2001 President George W. Bush intended to nominate former Member of Congress 
and former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox to the Ninth Circuit, but “Cox withdr[ew] from 
consideration . . . even before he was formally nominated.  [He] said he was unwilling to endure a difficult 
confirmation battle.”  Neil Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/26/us/washington-talk-road-to-federal-
bench-gets-bumpier-in-senate.html; see also Jonathan Turley, Seeing Red on Blue Slips, L. A. TIMES (May 16, 
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/16/local/me-64023 (discussing Sens. Boxer and Feinstein’s role in 
blocking Cox’s nomination). 
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the Senate.  But where one of these two conditions is not met, the President’s 
appointment will be delayed or blocked, and he will be forced to select candidates 
that are more centrist and thus less likely to attract opposition from the other side of 
the political aisle.  Depending on conditions in the Senate, the President may be 
forced to nominate and appoint judges whose policy views are antithetical to his 
own.61 
Which brings us back to California and the proposed split of the Ninth Circuit.  
As demonstrated above, there is no doubt that whatever remains of the Ninth Circuit 
after a split will be dominated by California far more than is the current Ninth Circuit.  
Nor can there be any doubt that California is, and for the foreseeable future will be, 
firmly in Democratic hands.  There is currently not a single Republican state-wide 
official, and Californians voted for the Democratic candidate in at least the last five 
presidential elections, usually with margins of sixty percent or more.62  The last time 
California had a Republican Senator was 1992 when Governor Wilson appointed 
John Seymor to succeed him in the Senate after Wilson was elected governor.  
Seymor then had to stand for election in 1992 and lost to Diane Feinstein, who is a 
formidable force in the Senate to this day. Because of California’s odd primary voting 
system, in the last election for senator, on the retirement of Senator Boxer, 
Californians voting in the general election had a choice of the liberal Democrat 
Kamala Harris and the very liberal Democrat Loretta Sanchez.63 
Thus there can be little doubt that, for the foreseeable future, the power of the 
Blue Slip as to Ninth Circuit appointments from California will lie firmly in 
Democratic hands.64 The addition of Hawaii and/or Oregon would not make much 
difference, first because they count for so few judgeships, and second because they 
too have no Republican senators.65  And if a bill is passed that adds judicial positions 
as part of the split process, this will only make matters worse for Republicans, 
because all of those positions will have to be added to the Ninth Circuit, and not to 
 
61  For example, President Clinton appointed Richard Tallman, a conservative Republican, to the Ninth 
Circuit in exchange for Senator Slade Gorton’s agreement to withdraw his objection to the confirmation of 
William Fletcher to the same court.  Fletcher was the son of Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher of Seattle, 
who was forced to take senior status so that Gorton could have his chosen candidate fill the seat.  Neil A. Lewis, 
A Nomination is Withdrawn, and a Deal is Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1999, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/28/us/a-nomination-is-withdrawn-and-a-deal-is-threatened.html; Tallman, 
Richard C., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/tallman-richard-c (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
62  Presidential Election in California, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_elect-
ion_in_California,_2016, (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
63  Sarah D. Wire, California Senate Candidates Loretta Sanchez and Kamala Harris on Policy Politics 
and the State of Their Race, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-harriz-
sanchez-california-senate-questions-20161014-snap-htmlstory.html. 
64  There are occasional calls for doing away with the blue slip, much as the Senate did away with the 
filibuster for judicial nominees.  Editorial, Giving Nominees the Blue Slip, WALL STR. J. (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/giving-nominees-the-blue-slip-1494458613. (“Blue slips aren’t a Senate or 
committee rule, and if Democrats abuse the tradition they should be dispensed with.”).  The difficulty is that 
the blue slip is a personal privilege enjoyed by every senator and giving it up risks every senator having the 
President appoint political enemies within their state.  This is going to be much harder to give up than the 
filibuster. 
65  See List of United States Senators from Hawaii, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_Uni-
ted_States_Senators_from_Hawaii (last visited Dec. 1, 2017); List of United States Senators from Oregon, 
Balltopedia., https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_United_States_Senators_from_Oregon (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
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the new Twelfth.  This is because, despite the profusion of judges in California, the 
state is actually under-represented in terms of judicial manpower.  We can see this 
using case statistics for 2016.  If California had been a circuit by itself, it would have 
had sixteen active judges and 7,321 appeals, or 458 cases per judge.66  This would 
have left 3,984 cases for the thirteen non-California judges, or 305 cases per judge.  
Even if five new positions were added in California, the number of cases per judge 
(348) would still be substantially higher than for the rest of the circuit.  The little-
appreciated reality is that the outlying states actually subsidize California in terms of 
judicial manpower, and also import the leavening effect of judges appointed from 
states with rural communities and Republican senators.   
The net effect of a split will therefore very likely be a Ninth Circuit that is far 
more liberal than the current Ninth Circuit.  Over time, judicial vacancies will be 
created by retirement, death, or addition of judicial positions by Congress.  When the 
occupant of the White House is a Democrat and the Senate is Democratic, the 
President will have a free hand to appoint judges that match his political leanings.  
But when the President is a Republican, he will at the very least be constrained by 
the Blue Slip process to appoint judges of a more moderate mold so as to eliminate 
senatorial opposition.  And if the Senate is in Democratic hands, a Republican 
president may well be blocked or significantly delayed in making appointments to 
the Ninth Circuit, as the two Senators from Texas delayed or blocked appointments 
to the Fifth Circuit.67 
With Democratic presidents having a relatively free hand to appoint liberals and 
Republican presidents being blocked, delayed, or constrained by the Senate to 
appoint moderates, the California Ninth Circuit will inevitably move to reflect the 
demographics and politics of California.  The beneficial effects of demographic and 
political diversity will be lost.  From a political perspective, a court composed of 
liberal and moderate judges, with fewer and fewer conservative voices, will 
inexorably move to the left, constrained only imperfectly by the Supreme Court.  
And, as Sunstein predicts, there will be frequent instances “in which deliberation has 
a pathological effect when judges are like-minded and causes them to take extreme 
positions.”68 
The effect of any split, then, is likely to be an even more liberal Ninth Circuit, a 
situation reminiscent of the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, when President Carter filled 
(with no push-back from the Senate) more than half of the twenty-three judicial 
positions that then constituted the full Ninth Circuit.  This new court will control 
seventy percent of the current Ninth Circuit’s caseload, and likely the lion’s share of 
the most important cases, generated by the large commercial and cultural centers 
around Los Angeles and San Francisco.  And, of course, it will become a magnet for 
litigation, as those who have a choice of venue will seek to increase their chances of 
success by filing their cases in the circuit with the most liberal judges. 
 
66  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
67  See Recio, supra note 55. 
68  Fischman, supra note 40, at 809 (citing Sunstein et. al, at 7178). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Republican lawmakers pursuing a split of the Ninth Circuit are not going to 
be happy with the result they achieve if they succeed in their efforts.  The outer states 
of the circuit not only provide judicial manpower for the cases generated in 
California, they provide breadth of perspective and balance to what would otherwise 
be an even more liberal court.  If some or all of those state are removed, and 
California is left alone, or only in the company of Hawaii and Oregon, the resulting 
circuit will bring conservative politicians even more unhappiness than they suffer 
today.  This is not an effort worth undertaking; they would be well advised to leave 
well enough alone. 
SIDEBAR: ARTICLE III JUDGES WITH SCOTUS CLERKSHIPS 
An interesting question is whether the confirmation battles over the last three 
decades have had an adverse effect on people willing to accept appointments to the 
federal courts.  It is argued by some that the intrusiveness, delay and uncertainty of 
the confirmation process has deterred qualified applicants from subjecting 
themselves to the nomination process and that the quality of judicial appointments 
has therefore suffered. 
To test this proposition, I examined a single criterion: the number of appointees 
to the federal bench who have previously served as Supreme Court law clerks.  While 
there are other criteria I might have used, this one is easy to document because this 
information can be extracted from the Federal Judicial Center website.69 
This database discloses that, aside from two appointments in 1939 (Francis 
Biddle to the Third Circuit and Calvert Magruder to the First Circuit), presidents 
started appointing SCOTUS law clerks to the federal bench starting in 1959 with 
Henry Friendly, appointed to the Second Circuit by President Eisenhower.  President 
Johnson appointed Harold Leventhal to the DC Circuit in 1965 and President Nixon 
appointed John Paul Stevens to the Seventh Circuit in 1970.  For the subsequent 







 CARTER REAGAN   BUSH 41   CLINTON   BUSH 43   OBAMA 
Total 41 50 20 47 47 35 
SCOTUS 
clerks 
4 6 4 10 9 10 
 
Percent 10% 12% 20% 21% 19% 29% 
 
69   Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges: Export, Fed. Jud. Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/hist-
ory/judges/biographical-directory-article-iii-federal-judges-export (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
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The percentage of SCOTUS clerks among Court of Appeals appointees is 
actually increasing.  When you add to this the fact that both President Obama’s and 
President Trump’s nominees to the Scalia seat on the Supreme Court had SCOTUS 
clerkships, it seems to suggest that the quality of appointees to the Courts of Appeals 
is not deteriorating as a result of the confirmation battles. 
 
